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Abstract—Little or no research has been directed to analysis 
and researching forensic analysis of the Bitcoin mixing or 
‘tumbling’ service themselves. This work is intended to examine 
effective tooling and methodology for recovering forensic 
artifacts from two privacy focused mixing services namely 
Obscuro which uses the secure enclave on intel chips to provide 
enhanced confidentiality and Wasabi wallet which uses 
CoinJoin to mix and obfuscate crypto currencies. These wallets 
were set up on VMs and then several forensic tools used to 
examine these VM images for relevant forensic artifacts. These 
forensic tools were able to recover a broad range of forensic 
artifacts and found both network forensics and logging files to 
be a useful source of artifacts to deanonymize these mixing 
services.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2021, US officials arrested and seized the servers of 
Bitcoin Fog who they accused of laundering over 1.2 Million 
Bitcoin  which in turn had laundered over $330 million in real 
terms. When the FBI seized these servers, they will have been 
confronted by a complicated privacy-focused operation 
looking to obfuscate users’ fund. Having been confronted by 
this bitcoin mixer and a system designed to obscure the source 
of the bitcoin and the identities of the users, law enforcement 
would have needed to utilise a different skill set and set of 
tools to trace the funds, completely unlike the forensic 
accounting techniques used for more traditional forms of 
money laundering.  
Bitcoin was conceived as a peer-to-peer currency [1], 
where users can send and receive bitcoin via peer exchange. 
Users create a key pair, which consists of a public key which 
identifies the account to the world, and a private key, which is 
used to cryptographically sign transactions. Transactions list 
inputs and outputs. Inputs contain previous transactions which 
contain amounts of bitcoin. This is to evidence that coins have 
not already been transferred or spent.  
Bitcoin uses a proof-of-work (PoW) system to verify 
transactions and to prevent double-spending. Conflicts in the 
system are resolved by majority decisions, with the weight of 
the vote based on computational power. Records of this spend 
are appended to the public record on the blockchain. To check 
that bitcoins have not already been spent, blockchain users 
keep an index of unspent transactions and reject those with 
invalid inputs from being integrated into a block. Bitcoin and 
other crypto currencies are generally thought to be anonymous 
and while the holder of wallets and coins are generally 
anonymous, the intricately public nature of the blockchain 
means that all transactions are stored publicly and are, by 
definition, available for inspection. Establishing the owner of 
the wallet holding the bitcoin or benefiting from its use can 
de-anonymise it. Mixing services are a reaction to this risk and 
aim to break the link between holder of the wallet and the 
origin of the coins by mixing the coins of multiple users, 
making it harder to find a relationship between input and 
output transactions. Bitcoin tumbling (or mixing) is used to 
provide an extra level of anonymity in bitcoin transactions. 
They work by mixing potentially identifiable or 'tainted' 
cryptocurrency funds with others, to obscure the trail back to 
the fund's original source. This addresses the privacy concern 
with bitcoin transactions that while the possessor or ‘owner’ 
of the currency might be anonymous, the transactions are by 
their nature recorded on the blockchain and visible for 
inspection. These services are characterised in [2] as providing 
anonymity via relationship anonymity. 
This work will look to evaluate tooling and methodology 
when analysing bitcoin mixing services after forensic seizure 
and contribute to the current research base by examining what 
real world, publicly available tools and techniques uncover 
forensically as well as looking at the sources of artefacts that 
will require further academic attention. Its main focus will be 
in exploring: (a) What can be recovered from these services 
and what tooling is most effective? (b) How useful would this 
evidence be to investigators? (c) What additional techniques 
or approaches might generate best evidence for law 
enforcement? and (d) What mixing service techniques make 
them robust to forensic recovery? 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current research in this area has focused on forensic 
analysis of the blockchain itself in general [3] or to identify 
mixing services via open-source intelligence from the 
blockchain [4]. 
It is possible to use Bitcoin addresses to identify users. The 
authors in [5] analysed structural aspects of the blockchain 
transaction to graph and draw implications on the anonymity 
of transactions. Similarly, the authors in [6] studied privacy 
implications of multi-input transactions and shadow addresses 
generated by the Bitcoin client for receiving change. The 
method by which the block chain is analysed to determine 
which bitcoin addresses are related to others is called taint 
analysis.  
Forensic blockchain analysis has paid dividends. 
Meiklejohn et al. [7] could identify 40% of the users in an 
artificial transaction graph based on (simulated) behaviour. It 
was possible to identify many intermediaries by interacting 
with them and using a change address heuristic to discover 
addresses of the same user. Using this dataset, they analysed 
popular thefts and related pay-outs to popular exchanges. 
Seizing these servers and recovering information 
appropriately will help unlock a significant amount of 
anonymity to these transactions. If investigators have 
knowledge of bitcoin addresses owned by both the person of 
interest and the third-party mixing service, they can identify 
the transactions between the two. Users must trust that the 
service has enough customers in order to effectively mix the 
number of bitcoins they have deposited and that they do not 
retain any log files of the mixing. The above indicates that at 
least in some cases, the mixing services may not be as secure 
as they suggest to their users, with transactions of services 
being able to be picked out of the blockchain or services being 
hacked with some degree of ease. 
Wasabi wallet is one of the officially recommended 
desktop Bitcoin wallets and one of the few with integrated 
CoinJoin 1  functionality. Wasabi wallets  are increasingly 
important in law enforcement investigations. The EU 2020 
assessment of cybercrime noted that privacy-enhanced wallet 
services using CoinJoin concepts such as Wasabi have 
emerged in their assessment as a top threat in addition to well 
established centralised mixers (IOCTA 2020). Wasabi wallet 
also conducts all communications via TOR providing 
additional anonymity to transactions.  
CoinJoin is a response by the bitcoin core developers to 
provide greater relationship anonymity to bitcoin users. This 
service does not rely on a centralized mixing platform. 
ConJoin arranges structured transactions merging different 
inputs and outputs in a single transaction. This makes 
matching transactions much more difficult to track which 
input ‘pays’ which output, thus making attribution difficult. 
Outputs in a CoinJoin must be equal to ensure that all users 
receive the same value output when the process completes. If 
there are differences in pay-outs, this could lead to 
deanonymisation. Crucially for bitcoin forensics, the 
coordinator of a CoinJoin has insight into users’ information 
that could allow them to link inputs to a user. This opens up 
the potential of uncovering important artefacts if a Wasabi 
Wallet is forensically analysed. This role will carry on even 
when Wasabi Wallet2  2.0 is put into production.  
Obscuro takes a similar approach, using a de-centralised 
mixing service, albeit one which employs distinct anti-
forensic techniques. Obscuro employs hardware-based trusted 
execution environments (TEE) to protect its mixing 
operations from its operating environment. The content of the 
secure enclave is encrypted and stored in RAM, leaving 
theoretically minimal artefacts on the drive of the system in 
which it operates, providing strong memory integrity and 
confidentiality. Obscuro utilises Intel's SGX system secure 
enclave to separate application data from the rest of the 
system. Grundmann et al [8] have called this and similar 
services of TEEs BANKLAVES. Examples include 
Tesserect, Teechain and Obscuro.  
Banklaves generally work by creating a new network of 
secure enclaved mixers. Typically, they work as follows: 
Alice starts her client creating the first enclave Ea. Bob joins 
the network by letting his enclave Eb perform a remote 
attestation with Ea. To deposit, Alice’s enclave to creates a 
deposit address. Then, Alice creates a Bitcoin transaction to 
this address, publishes to the blockchain and gives the 
transaction to her enclave. Alice checks that the transaction is 
part of a blockchain and increments Alice’s balance in the 
state. For transfers between Alice and Bob, Alice calls the 
function in her enclave and passes the amount and the receiver 
of the transaction. Ea verifies that Alice has enough balance 
 
1 https://coinjoin.io/en 
available for that transaction and then updates the balances 
and sends them to Eb. If Alice wants to cash out, her enclave 
creates a Bitcoin transaction that she can publish on the 
blockchain. This transaction spends cAlicebitcoins from the 
unspent transaction outputs managed by the enclave network 
to an address provided by Alice Ab [9]. 
The benefit of TEEs is that they are created with the 
assumption that in the event of a compromised OS, the enclave 
is secure and separated from the attacker, barring side channel 
attacks. The work in [8] outline as one of the key security 
objectives of TEEs that they aim to keep user balances and 
their performed transactions confidential from curious 
attackers. Bentov et al in [9] created Tesseract based on the 
assumption that an adversary (potentially the exchange 
operator) can gain complete physical access to the host in 
which the funds are stored and complete control of its network 
connections.  
There is a surprising lack of research on the actual security 
of these systems. Most research has looked at various different 
models for implementation (e.g., Tesseract, Teechain, 
Obscuro) with differing attack vectors based on manipulation 
of inputs and outputs and unfaithful parties. There is little or 
no academic research currently available which looks at what 
forensic artefacts such mixers leave and how robust these 
wallets and mixing services are to modern forensic 
techniques. This paper is designed to fill in these research 
gaps. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Creation of mixers – Choice of VM, steps to Creation 
and Issues with Deprecation 
This project used virtualisation in order to facilitate the 
creation of these mixing services as well as making imaging 
and analysis simpler. This is also more reflective of the 
environment these services are likely to be run in, namely 
virtualised on cloud service providers. Two separate VMs 
were created to facilitate this experiment.  
 
Fig. 1. VM1 to host Wasabi  
VM1 was used to host Wasabi wallet. A virtual machine 
was created in virtual box (as this allowed for snap shotting of 
progress). This was compiled and built on Ubuntu 20.04 
desktop and used an AMD Ryzen7 3.5 GHZ using 1 core and 
8gb of memory Wasabi wallet was constructed in line with its 
instruction on Github (See Fig. 1). 
VM2 was used to host Obscuro. This similarly was created 
as a VDX and mounted in virtual box again as this allowed 
snap shotting to take place. Obscuro had an issue with 
compilation as some of its components were being deprecated. 
A VDX was constructed with Obscuro and was built on an 
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Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS Server 64bits operating system using 
1GB of memory and 1 CPU core on an Intel I7. 1.8GHZ 
processor. Due to issues with deprecation of certain elements 
of Obscuro, this was the only operating system it was 
configured to work appropriately under. As this was a server 
version, a GUI was installed over the top in the form of a 
GNOME UI (See Fig.2). 
 
Fig. 2. VM2 to host Obscuro 
B. Integration of Testnet/Regtest data and creating data for 
Forensic Recovery 
Both VMs were started and the services of both Obscuro 
and Wasabi wallet started, had Regtest coins inserted into 
them and mixing services started. Regtest bitcoins are user 
created coins based on a private localised block chain with the 
same basic rules as bitcoin. As they are isolated there is no 
external communication, and this can be used as a quick and 
effective method for ascertaining how the mixing service 
works.  
Mixing with Regtest coins proved successful so the 
experiment proceeded to use Testnet coins to mix within these 
services. Testnet is an alternative blockchain which can be 
used for testing. It operates like normal bitcoin, but the coins 
purposely hold no value. They need to be mined just like 
normal bitcoin and operate on a separate public blockchain. 
Due to the requirement for mining, Testnet coins are more 
difficult to come by but are available from several public 
faucets.  
Testnet coins were used for this experiment as they 
provide a good approximation of true operation of these 
mixing services. Testnet mixing requires external 
communication with peers on the blockchain and operates 
identically to how real bitcoin and mixing would occur. They 
have the benefit of being free and available, designed for using 
during testing (so not linked to personal accounts of other 
users) and identical to Mainnet coins. Both VM’s and services 
then began mixing using Regtest. Obscuro was cycled a 
number of times using Regtest coins (3 x 100) to generate 
sufficient test data to recover. Subsequently, Testnet coins 
were used imported to simulate network traffic.  
Three Wasabi wallets were created and Testnet coins 
transferred into these. These wallets then CoinJoined between 
themselves and peers on the Testnet blockchain until the coins 
were mixed by this process. 
C. Choice of Forensic Tools – Suites Vs Standalone Tools 
An investigation was made into existing tools to analyse 
VM1 and VM2. There are few to no standalone forensic tools 
designed to examine wallets or mixing services. There are a 
great multitude of tools such as chain analysis and blockchain 
explorer which are excellent at visualising and linking public 
blockchain activity and relationships and making this easy to 
use. As previously discussed in this work, there is little 
research conducted into analysis of wallets and mixing 
services themselves and consequently there are few 
standalone tools designed to provide forensic analysis or 
recovery of key artefacts.   
Instead, Forensic suites would be used, and then specific 
forensic artefacts searched for within these tooling sets. This 
would have the benefit of allowing numerous tools to be used 
to examine for significant artefacts as well as providing 
advanced capabilities such as file and data stream carving, 
signature analysis and more enhanced parsing of specific 
applications.  
Autopsy was chosen as one of the suites to be used. 
Autopsy is one of the main open-source digital forensics 
platform allowing analysis of hard drives, smart phones, 
media cards, etc. It is designed to offer analysis which is very 
similar to more premium, paid for suites in terms of capability 
while remaining open-source and, crucially, adaptable by 
virtue of its support for plugins which allow people to add 
functionality and, where appropriate, for these to be 
authorised by its maintainers as supported plugins. Crucially, 
Autopsy maintains a supported third party module for Bitcoin 
and wallet forensics.  
FTK imager was the second suite used on VM1 and VM2. 
FTK Imager is an open-source software by AccessData which 
was chosen for its powerful ability to mount and parse image 
files. It is robust and able to deal with Linux/Unix OS’s 
effectively as well as Windows operating systems.  
Axiom is a paid-for, comprehensive suite of tools. Axiom 
allows images of devices to be captured, processes the images 
to recover data and provides analytical tools. It has significant 
capabilities to automate carving and parsing via machine 
learning as well as providing advanced capabilities such as 
mapping cross case correlations, and using advanced keyword 
searches, filtering and tags. Axiom has quickly come to 
dominate the field in terms of law enforcement forensic 
tooling and represents a more comprehensive tool than its 
niche but well-respected predecessor, IEF finder. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
With the bitcoin mixing services in operation and a test run 
on a multi-pronged approach to forensic recovery was then 
attempted. The design of this experiment was as follows. Each 
VM was analysed using a number of approaches using 
standard available tooling and examining for the below key 
artefact types: (a) Wallet data: For example Wallet.dat files 
that will provide the first transaction details, its current 
balance and the total amount received in that wallet since it 
was first seen; (b) Peer data: For example peers.dat files that 
contains IP addresses of peers the mixing service has 
connected to; (c) Public and private keys. This data will 
provide significant ownership evidence since the private key 
should only be available to the holder of the wallet; (d) Bitcoin 
transaction data. This is extremely important information for 
both matching transactions across the blockchain, but also for 
providing essentially logging data of what the mixing service 
has done to obfuscate the transactions; (e) Key word searching 
using the following regular expression which should highlight 
bitcoin artefacts [ For Bitcoin wallet addresses: ^[13][a-km-
zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}$ and for Bitcoin private key strings: 
^[5KL][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{50,51}$] 
A. Wasabi Wallet (VM1) 
1) Autopsy 
The .VDMK was loaded into Autopsy (4.17.0) and VM 
file selected as a data source. The VDMK was selected and 
auto detect selected for sector size. Autopsy comes with 
several built-in ingest models. All of these were selected 
including the Bitcoin FEA plugin which keyword searches for 
relevant bitcoin artifacts. The VDMK was then ingested and 
indexed by Autopsy. The FEA plugin produced no additional 
hits. Further keyword searching (wallet.dat,peer.dat,public 
key, private key, info.dat,bitcoin,coin) was expanded to look 
for significant artifacts. This yielded no additional worthwhile 
results though. 
While keyword searching generated numerous hits, upon 
examination these were not relevant nor provided interesting 
forensic artefacts in relation to the operation of Wasabi 
Wallets. A file of note was recovered using the key word 
‘wallet.dat’. This file Name achilles_achilles.png appears to 
be a debugging file. Its unusual name might reflect some 
knowledge logging that in turn might reveal sensitive 
information that would undermine its confidentiality. 
Analysis of this file showed that it did contain some sensitive 
information (e.g., hash values and geneses block details), but 
did not reveal any sensitive information that could be used to 
undermine the anonymization of the mixing service or reveal 
information about wallet operation.   
2) FTK 
The .VDMK was loaded into FTK imager (4.17.0) and the 
VM file selected as a data source. FTK was unable to identify 
Wasabi wallet or any artefacts related to it. While it was able 
to identify the partition correctly, it could not identify anything 
underneath the parent home folder in which Wasabi was 
installed. It is highly likely some of this data has been wrongly 
assumed by FTK to be unallocated space. This could possibly 
be down to FTK having trouble interpreting the MFT of the 
VDMK either because of the variant of Ubuntu used or due to 
its virtualised nature. Regardless, it had a negative effect on 
forensic recovery. 
3) AXIOM 
The .VDMK was loaded into AXIOM (v3.5.1.1) which 
was running in the SIFT workstation which in turn was 
running in VM workstation 15. The Axiom process was used 
to process the VDMK and then loaded into Axiom Examine 
for further analysis. All evidence categories were selected to 
ensure that as much relevant information was processed for 
analysis as possible. Axiom contains several preconfigured 
artefact searches including for Bitcoin.  
Axiom was not able to identify bitcoin transactions unlike 
with Obscuro. It was able to identify the use of TOR on this 
VM which is utilised by Wasabi wallet for traffic to peers and 
the blockchain. The absence of it being able to identify bitcoin 
transactions could possibly be explained since the wallet itself 
is encrypted as well as the private key with BIP: 38. As such, 
file or data stream carving would not be feasible as the 
contents would be obfuscated. See Table I. 






Wallet.dat No No 






Public Key No No 
Private Key No No 
Info.dat No No 
Bitcoin Yes (3) No 
Coin No No 
Bitcoin wallet addresses: 
^[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-
9]{25,34}$ 
Yes (2) No 




B. Obscuro (VM2)  
1) Autopsy 
The .VDMK was loaded into Autopsy (4.17.0) and VM 
file selected as a data source. The VDMK was selected and 
auto detect selected for sector size. Autopsy comes with 
several built-in ingest models. All of these were selected, 
including the Bitcoin FEA plugin which keyword searches for 
relevant bitcoin artefacts. The VDMK was then ingested and 
indexed by Autopsy. Autopsy appeared to have difficulty 
reading the image effectively as it seemed to believe the image 
to be almost entirely unallocated space. This is likely to be 
related to Obscuro’s use of a server-based version of Ubuntu 
that Autopsy is not configured to process properly. However, 
Autopsy was able to parse the image and recover significant 
file structure including the Wasabi wallet parent folder. The 
FEA plugin produced no relevant hits as demonstrated below.  
Further keyword searching (wallet.dat,peer.dat,public key, 
private key, info.dat,bitcoin,coin) was expanded to look for 
significant artefacts. This yielded some additional results as 
can be seen in Table II.  
TABLE II.  KEYWORD SEARCH RESULTS WITH AUTOPSY 
Keyword Positive Hits Relevant Material 
Wallet.dat Yes (4) Yes 
Peer.dat No No 
Public Key Yes (711) All false positive 
Private Key Yes (778) All false positive 
Info.dat No No 
Bitcoin Yes (116) Yes (3) 
Coin Yes (47) All false positive 
 
A key word search for “Wallet.dat” recovered 4 files of 
interest in unallocated space.  Bitcoin contains log data but no 
information of relevance. The remaining 3 files  
$CarvedFiles/f1830504.db,Unalloc_509_512753664_10736
369664 and  /$carvedfiles/f5855600.txt contained identical 
fragments of x64 assembly code which appear to be in dump 
format which shows transactions, public keys and transaction 
hashes. A key word search for “Bitcoin” recovered 116 files. 
Of particular interest was a recovered database file 
CarvedFiles/f1830504.db. Examination of this db appears to 
be a chainstate db. This db will provide a representation of all 
currently unspent transaction outputs and some metadata 
about the transactions they are from. This is used to validate 
incoming blocks and transactions. A truncated example is 
produced below. This again is an example of the 
confidentiality of this environment being undermined. 
2) FTK 
The .VDMK was loaded into FTK imager (4.17.0) and the 
VM file selected as a data source. FTK could recover some 
forensic artefacts of interest and was able to read the OS and 
File system structure of the VM much more effectively and 
present a better overview of the file structure than Autopsy. 
Almost immediately, it was possible to pick out important 
files for forensic analysis of bitcoin miners. Namely, it was 
trivial to identify and recover peers.dat and wallet.dat which 
as previously discussed contain significant information about 
bitcoin held on the VM as well as peers on the network it had 
connected with. This wallet.dat file could be trivially imported 
into the bitcoinqt client or pwallet.py and significant forensic 
artefacts like transactions. Critically, the private key details 
could be extracted and be mounted by anyone looking to 
examine the files for further forensic evidence. An example of 
recoverable data is produced below. Wallet.dat was copied to 
a new Linux VM and pywallet.py used to extract relevant data. 
This trivially revealed sensitive data such as secret and private 
keys. 
3) AXIOM 
The .VDMK was loaded into AXIOM (v3.5.1.1) which 
was running in the SIFT workstation running in VM 
workstation 15. The Axiom process was used to process the 
VDMK and then loaded into Axiom Examine for further 
analysis. All evidence categories were selected to ensure that 
as much relevant information was processed for analysis as 
possible. Axiom contains a number of preconfigured artefact 
searches, including those relating to bitcoin transactions 
which it classifies as “Peer to Peer”. AXIOM was able to 
recover a significant amount of additional general forensic 
artefacts versus Autopsy and FTK, including numerous emails 
and details of browser activity. In particular, it was able to 
successfully carve an excel file containing bitcoin debug logs 
in physical sectors 2832113 to 6857201. This carved 
document contains detailed bitcoin transaction logs, including 
wallets being loaded and transactions being sent and received. 
As previously detailed in this dissertation, this information 
undermines the confidentiality of the Obscuro executing 
transactions within its trusted execution environment when 
these are recoverable from debug logs the mixer is 
maintaining. Further keyword searching 
(wallet.dat,peer.dat,public key, private key, 
info.dat,bitcoin,coin) was expanded to look for significant 
artifacts. No useful findings returned though. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We met our generalised aims in that we were able to report 
on significant artefacts recovered from the mixing services. 
Particularly, we were able to recover peers.dat and wallet,dat 
from Obscuro via FTK which are significant artefacts. We 
were also able to recover interesting logging data from both 
mixers which could be used to undermine the confidentiality 
of these services. Axiom was unsurprisingly (given its 
ubiquity within law enforcement and its cost as a closed 
source product) able to produce the most artefacts and many 
of the most relevant ones. The most effective anti-forensic 
techniques employed by the mixing services involved 
encrypting data at rest and in transit. While Obscuro mixed in 
the secure enclave its subsequent writing to disk of this data 
in encrypted artefacts made this on silicon mixing for security 
slightly redundant.  
For Bitcoin users looking to ensure privacy and 
confidently for their transactions, this research provides a few 
important considerations. Users should look for mixing 
services that emphasise encryption at rest for their wallets and 
encryption in transit for their transactions. Doing so greatly 
limits the attack surface for forensic recovery of such 
transactions. Wasabi’s emphasis on this makes it an especially 
strong product in this regard. Obscuro, while offering an 
effective and secure mixing process, neglects to adopt defence 
in depth for its confidentiality. While the use of TOR by 
Wasabi is generally an assistance in these privacy and security 
concerns, users should still be aware that threat actors can and 
do target TOR nodes looking for bitcoin traffic in attempts to 
steal funds or reveal users.  
For those operating mixing services, the above holds 
equally true, but they should also look to proactively review 
their services and the wider operating system for what data 
created via any supporting frameworks their mixing services 
are logging, either directly or indirectly. That both Obscuro 
and Wasabi had log files which revealed information which 
could deanonymize transactions is indicative that this problem 
is widespread and could be used against multiple operators. 
This review would likely have to be done as part of penetration 
testing against these services on a regular basis to ensure that 
as the application, frameworks and the underlying operating 
systems are updated, new sources of logging are not created 
which could be recovered and used. In order to protect their 
users’ confidentiality, mixers should proactively review their 
services for inadvertent log collection, encrypt wallets at rest 
and transmit data via TOR or some other form of encrypted 
communications channel.   
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